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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Sanborn (1861) 1 Allen (Mass.) 389; Servel v. Corbett (Idaho 1930) 290
Pac. 200. But in Missouri the injured owner cannot maintain a statutory
interplea in an attachment unless he can identify the goods. Kelly-Good-
fellow Shoe Co. v. Sally (1905) 114 Mo. App. 222, 89 S. W. 889.
In relatively few cases courts have treated the former owners as ten-
ants in common of the whole mass. Davis v. Krum (1882) 12 Mo. App,
279; First National Bank of Rogers v. Tribble (1922) 155 Ark. 264, 244
S. W. 33. This seems to be the prevailing rule in England. Sandemen &
Sons v. Tyzack & Branfoot Steamship Co. Ltd. (1913) A. C. 680; Spence v.
Union Marine Insurance (1868) L. R. 3 C. P. 427. It is submitted that the
analogy is not perfect as tenancies in common normally arise through the
consent of the tenants. Where a statute exists, as in Missouri, for the
partition of tenancies in common of personalty at the request of either
party, calling the relationship a tenancy in common would make little dif-
ference if the other owner was vigilant to protect his rights. R. S. Mo.
(1929) secs. 1606-1608.
The decision in the case under review is unduly technical, for range cat-
tle in a single herd are necessarily closely similar in quality and value and
the action of replevin under the Codes was designed to give the claimant a
way to recover property in specie when he wished and could do so without
injuring the defendant. G. W. S., '33.
CImIINiAL LAw-PUNISHMENT-BANISHENT.-Defendant, convicted of
a violation of the liquor law, was fined and sentenced to leave the State
of Michigan within thirty days and not return for a period of five years.
Held, the sentence was unauthorized and contrary to public policy. Peo-
ple v. Baum, (Mich. 1930) 231 N. W. 95.
Very few cases of banishment by state courts have arisen. This type
of punishment, so frequently resorted to at common law, seems to have
been considered only by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in State
v. Baker (1900) 58 S. C. 111, 36 S. E. 501, holding that a sentence of per-
petual banishment from the state may not be imposed.
Banishment, which was first known in England as "adjuration," where
a party accused fled to sanctuary, confessed his crime, and took an oath
to leave the kingdom and not return without permission, was not consid-
ered at that time as a punishment, but as a conditional pardon. 4 BLA.
CoM. 333. It was well recognized at common law; and banishment as
a condition of pardon has been sustained in the United States. People v.
Potter (1895) 1 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 47.
Banishment is not a cruel or unusual punishment, and does not con-
stitute a violation of the guaranty against cruel and unusual punish-
ments. Legarda v. Valdez, 1 Philippine 146. The Michigan court in the
instant case did not place its decision on constitutional grounds but pointed
out that this method of punishment was not authorized by statute and
was contrary to public policy. To sustain its view of public policy the
court says, " . . . to permit one state to dump its convict criminals into
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another would entitle the state believing itself injured thereby to exer-
cise its police and military power, in the interests of its own peace, safe-
ty, and welfare, to repel such an invasion." Such action on the part of
one state would obviously result in chaos, each state seeking to cast its
convicts into the other states, causing the others to retaliate. The deci-
sion in the principal case is therefore consonant with sound reason.
F. E. F., '31.
PARENT AND CHILD-LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CHILDREN'S TORTS.-
Plaintiff brought action to recover damages for injuries sustained by
her minor child who had been struck and beaten by defendant's sixteen-
year-old child. The complaint alleged, and it was admitted by demurrer,
that defendants had knowledge of their son's vicious disposition and a
habit of persuading smaller boys into secluded places and beating them, and
that defendants failed to make efforts to restrain him. Held, judgment on
demurrer was properly rendered for the plaintiff. Ryley v. Lafferty (D. C.
N. D. Idaho 1930) 45 F. (2d) 641.
The established common-law rule is that parents are not liable for the
torts of their minor children committed without their knowledge or con-
sent. Tiff t v. Tiff t (1847) 4 Denio (N. Y.) 175; Bahe v. Haldman (1857) 24
Mo. 219; Paul v. Hummel (1868) 43 Mo. 119; Wilson v. Garrard (1871) 59
I1. 51; Ritter v, Thilodeaux (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) 41 S. W. 492.
But a parent may be liable for an injury caused by the child if the parent
contributed directly to the child's negligence. Hoverson v. Noker (1884)
60 Wis. 511, 19 N. W. 382; Stewart v. Swartz (1914) 57 Ind. App. 249, 106
N. E. 719; Meers v. McDowell (1901) 110 Ky. 926, 62 S. W. 1013. A peti-
tion alleging that parents furnished a velocipede to a child who was irre-
sponsible and unqualified to use the velocipede on account of his tender
years and that they knowingly permitted him to ride in a negligent manner,
stated a cause of action against the parents. Davis v. Gavalas (1927)
37 Ga. App. 242, 139 S. E. 577. Contra: Hagerty v. Powers (1885) 66 Cal.
368, 5 Pac. 622; Figone v. Guisti (1919) 43 Cal. App. 606, 185 Pac. 694.
Thus most courts are unwilling to hold that a parent is guilty of a breach
of duty in a case of this sort unless he knew of the particular situation
creating a likelihood of injury and failed to remedy it. Baker v. Haldeman
(1857) 24 Mo. 219; Paul v. Hummel (1868) 43 Mo. 119.
In Haunert v. Speier (1926) 214 Ky. 46, 281 S. W. 998, in which it was
sought to hold the parents for an assault committed by their minor son on
the ground that they had knowledge of previous assaults upon other chil-
dren, the defendants were held not liable. The court declared that if the
boy was "an intelligent responsible human being possessed of sufficient dis-
cretion to appreciate the probable results of his own acts," the assault was
his and not that of his parents.
But other courts have given effect to the view which was applied in the
principal case. Gudziewski v. Sternplesky (1928) 263 Mass. 103, 160 N. E.
334; Norton v. Payne (1929) 154 Wash. 241, 281 Pac. 991.
H. H. G., '33.
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